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AVAILABILITY OF DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY TO ATTACK A
MULTICOMPONENT EMPLOYMENT SYSTEM
In the last two decades there has been a fundamental change in em-
ployment practices due to the Government's enactment of statutes
prohibiting job-related discrimination.' One of the most significant
pieces of federal legislation, title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (title
VII), 2 prohibits an employer from denying an individual equal employ-
1. Follett & Welch, Testing for Discrimination in Employment Practices, LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1983, at 171. The first major federal legislation
prohibiting a private employer from discriminating against employees based on
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (title VII). 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982). Commentators have
noted the main focus of title VII was racial discrimination. Z. FASMAN, M. ALBUM
& T. GIES, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT AUDIT HANDBOOK 69-70 (1984) [hereinafter cited
as M. ALBUM & T. GIES]. The prohibition against sex discrimination was not
added to the statute until a day before the law was passed. Id. at 70. The first
kind of discrimination to be viewed by courts as prohibited under title VII was
intentional mistreatment of a protected individual or class (disparate treatment).
B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 1-2 (2d ed. 1983).
The most significant evolution of title VII since its inception was the courts'
expansion of discrimination to include neutral employment practices having an
adverse impact on protected classes of employees (disparate impact), and prac-
tices which preserve the effects of past discrimination. Id.
A second federal law prohibiting employment discrimination is the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982). The NLRA states
that its purpose is to promote "the practice and procedure of collective bargain-
ing" and to protect "the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-
organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the
purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other
mutual aid or protection." Id. § 151. The provisions of the NLRA prohibit dis-
crimination. Under § 8(a)(3) it is unlawful for an employer "by discrimination in
regard to hire or tenure of employment to encourage or discourage membership
in any labor organization." Id. § 158(a)(3). Section 8(b)(2) prohibits discrimi-
nation by Unions. Id. § 158(a)(4). Finally, under § 8(a)(4) it is unlawful for an
employer to "discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because
he has filed charges or given testimony under this Act." Id. § 158(a)(4). For a
further discussion of the NLRA as it relates to employment discrimination, see
L. MADJESKA, HANDLING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES § 7.1-7.2 (1980); 1
C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw ch. 7 (2d ed. 1983). For a discussion of
the history of the NLRA, see R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAw UNIONIZA-
TION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 1-6, 21-22 (1976).
In addition, other major federal laws prohibit employment discrimination
based on criteria not specifically addressed under title VII. See Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(d) (1983) (prohibiting employers from discriminat-
ing based on mental or physical handicap); Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C,
§ 206(a) (1983) (prohibiting employers from maintaining wage differentials
based upon sex); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621-34 (1983) (prohibiting employers from discriminating based upon age).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982). The Civil Rights Act is compre-
hensive in scope, providing protection against a wide range of discriminatory
acts. See id. §§ 2000e to 2000h-6 (1982). In particular, title VII of the Civil
(377)
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ment opportunities because of race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin. 3  The primary purpose of title VII is "to assure equality of
employment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory prac-
tices and devices which have fostered racially stratified job environments
to the disadvantage of minority citizens. ' 4 However, while title VII pro-
hibits intentionally discriminatory hiring and promotion practices, it
does not prohibit practices that unintentionally favor certain classes of
individuals, as long as the criteria are related to job performance. 5 This
is the so-called "business necessity" exception to title VII.6
The Government's concern with employment discrimination has
produced a vast amount of litigation. 7 Much of the litigation has fo-
cused on the fundamental question of how an employee proves discrimi-
nation. One controversial aspect of this issue involves whether an
employee can use the disparate impact theory of discrimination to attack
a multicomponent employment system generally,8 on the ground that
Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in employment. See id. § 2000e to
2000e- 17.
3. Id. § 2000e-2(a). Under the express terms of title VII it is unlawful for an
employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
vidual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any indi-
vidual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.
Id.
4. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) (citations
omitted).
5. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). In Griggs, the
Supreme Court stated:
Congress did not intend by Title VII .. .to guarantee a job to every
person regardless of qualifications. In short, the Act does not com-
mand that any person be hired simply because he was formerly the sub-
ject of discrimination, or because he is a member of a minority group.
Discriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, is pre-
cisely and only what Congress has proscribed.
Id. at 430-31.
6. For a discussion of the business necessity defense, see infra note 30 and
accompanying text.
7. Follett & Welch, supra note 1, at 172. Follett and Welch note that the
budget of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) increased
from $3 million in 1966 to $142 million in 1981. Between 1971 and 1981 the
number of civil rights cases tried by federal courts nearly quadrupled to 13,750
per year. Id.
8. The term "employment system" is used throughout this note to describe
the multicomponent process that an employer uses to make its selection, promo-
tion, job allocation, and salary decisions. A specific component or criterion of
the employment system, for instance, a written test, will be referred to in this
note as an "employment criterion" or "employment practice."
378 [Vol. 31: p. 377
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the entire system violates title VII.9 Under the disparate impact theory,
facially neutral employment practices that have a disparate impact upon
a protected class are prohibited by title VII unless the employer can
prove that such practices are justified by a business necessity.' 0 The
disparate impact theory traditionally has been used to challenge single
identifiable components of an employment system, such as written tests
or particular height and weight restrictions. " In the. seminal case of
Pouncy v. Prudential Insurance Co.12 the Fifth Circuit held that the dispa-
9. There is also a split among the circuits as to whether disparate impact
theory may be utilized to challenge subjectively based or highly discretionary
employment practices, for example, an evaluation based on an oral interview.
Compare Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516, 1523 (11 th Cir. 1985) (disparate impact
theory is applicable to subjective employment criteria); Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d
1249, 1288 n.34 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2357 (1985); Rowe v.
Cleveland Pneumatic Co., 690 F.2d 88, 95 (6th Cir. 1982); Clark v. Chrysler
Corp., 673 F.2d 921, 923 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 873 (1982); Williams v.
Colorado Springs School Dist., 641 F.2d 835, 842 (10th Cir. 1981) with Antonio
v. Wards Cove Parking Co., 768 F.2d 1120, 1131 (9th Cir. 1985) (disparate im-
pact theory is not applicable to subjective criteria); Talley v. United States Postal
Serv., 720 F.2d 505, 507 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2155 (1984);
Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co., 668 F.2d 795, 799-800 (5th Cir. 1982); Pope v.
City of Hickory, 679 F.2d 20, 22 (4th Cir. 1982). Recently, the Fifth Circuit
appears to have retreated from its position that disparate impact analysis is inap-
plicable to subjective employment practices. See Page v. United States Indus.,
Inc., 726 F.2d 1038, 1046 (5th Cir. 1984). For a discussion of Page, see infra
note 59 and accompanying text. A number of labor law scholars have addressed
the use of disparate impact theory to challenge subjectively based employment
decisions. See generally M. ALBUM & T. GIES, supra note 1, at 83-87; B. SCHLEI &
P. GROSSMAN, supra note 1, at 1289 ("three-stage adverse impact model is inap-
plicable since in an 'excessive subjectivity' case, if adverse impact is established,
there is no specific employment requirement such as a test or an education re-
quirement which the employer can establish is job related"); Rigler, Title VII and
the Applicability of Disparate Impact Analysis to Subjective Selection Criteria, 88 W. VA. L.
REV. 25 (1985); Willborn, The Disparate Impact Model of Discrimination: Theory and
Limits, 34 AM. L. REV. 799, 831-33 (1985).
The issues of the applicability of disparate impact analysis to attack mul-
ticomponent employment systems and subjective employment criteria are often
interrelated, since multicriteria employment systems often contain subjective
components.
Even if it is determined that only objective employment criteria are appro-
priately challenged under the disparate impact model, subjective criteria are still
subject to attack under the disparate treatment theory. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSS-
MAN, supra note 1, at 191.
10. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). The disparate
impact theory of discrimination was first developed in Griggs. Prior to the Griggs
decision, most courts required plaintiffs to prove intentional discrimination in
order to establish a violation of title VII. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 1,
at 2. For a further discussion of Griggs, see infra notes 25-27 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of the business necessity defense, see infra note 29 and
accompanying text.
11. For a discussion of the traditional use of disparate impact theory, see
infra note 72-74 and accompanying text.
12. 668 F.2d 795, 799-802 (5th Cir. 1982). For a discussion of Pouncy, see
infra notes 42-53 and accompanying text.
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rate impact theory could not be taken beyond its traditional context to
challenge a multicomponent employment system as a whole.13 To date,
five circuits have embraced the Pouncy view. 14 However, two other cir-
cuits have ruled that the theory may be used to challenge a multicom-
ponent employment system. 15
The Supreme Court and the remaining circuits have not yet
adopted a position on this issue. Thus, there is a need to determine
whether, theoretically and practically, it is appropriate to use the dispa-
rate impact theory to challenge an employment system as a whole,
rather than challenging single, identifiable elements of that system.
13. 668 F.2d at 799-802. Under the Pouncy view, a multicomponent hiring
system would not be subject to general attack based on a disparate impact analy-
sis, but a specific component of that system would be subject to such an attack.
Id.
14. See American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Washington,
770 F.2d 1401, 1405-06 (9th Cir. 1985); Robinson v. Polaroid Corp., 732 F.2d
1010, 1014 (1st Cir. 1984); EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d 633, 638-
39 (4th Cir. 1983), rev'don other grounds sub nom. Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank,
104 S. Ct. 2794 (1984); Mortensen v. Callaway, 672 F.2d 822, 824 (10th Cir.
1982); Smithers v. Bailor, 629 F.2d 892, 898-99 (3d Cir. 1980). But see Green v.
United States Steel Corp., 570 F. Supp. 254, 274 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (disparate im-
pact may be used to challenge multiple employment practices).
In American Federation, state employees who worked in job categories consist-
ing of at least 70% female employees brought suit against the state under the
disparate impact theory alleging, inter alia, that the state's practice of basing
wages on competitive market rates, rather than on a theory of comparable
worth, has a disparate impact on women. 770 F.2d at 1405. The Ninth Circuit
held that "a compensation system that is responsive to supply and demand and
other market forces is not the type of specific, clearly delineated employment
policy contemplated by Dothard and Griggs." Id. at 1406 (citing Dothard v. Rowl-
inson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977)). Rather, the court concluded, "Such cases are con-
trolled by disparate treatment analysis." Id.
In Robinson, black employees attacked Polaroid's layoff policy, which pro-
tected senior employees, under the disparate impact theory. 732 F.2d at 1010.
The First Circuit held the theory to be inapplicable, since the plaintiffs had failed
to demonstrate a causal relationship between the disproportionate number of
black layoffs and the seniority rule. Id. at 1016. In Federal Reserve Bank, the
EEOC charged the defendant with discriminating against blacks in promotion
practices. 698 F.2d at 337. The Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiffs did not
make out a prima facie disparate impact claim since no objective promotion cri-
terion was under attack. Id. at 639. In Mortensen, the Tenth Circuit held that the
plaintiff's disparate impact action failed because she failed to demonstrate that
the low proportion of women in the position at issue resulted from a specific,
facially neutral employment practice. 732 F.2d at 1014. In Smithers, a 64-year-
old black male used the disparate impact theory to challenge the United States
Postal Service's failure to hire him as a postmaster. 629 F.2d at 898-99. The
Third Circuit rejected his claim, finding the theory unpersuasive because the
applicant was unable to show that a specific hiring policy was the cause of the
disproportionately low employment of blacks. Id. at 899.
15. See Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516, 1522-25 (11 th Cir. 1985); Gilbert v.
City of Little Rock, 722 F.2d 1390, 1396 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
2347 (1984).
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This note will examine the split among the circuits regarding the use of
the disparate impact theory in this context. Part I reviews the initial
development of title VII disparate impact analysis. Part II discusses the
circuits' conflicting rationales for requiring or not requiring a plaintiff to
identify the particular component of an employment system that causes
a disparate impact before bringing an action based on that theory. Part
III concludes that the Pouncy view-restricting the disparate impact the-
ory to single-component attacks-should not be followed because it
contravenes the congressional intent underlying title VII.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY
Title VII actions may be based upon either of two legal theories,
disparate treatment or disparate impact. 16 Disparate treatment is
proved by showing that an employer intentionally treats an employee or
16. The distinction between the disparate treatment and disparate impact
analyses has been explained clearly by the Supreme Court. See International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1979). In Teamsters, the Court
noted:
'Disparate treatment' such as is alleged in the present case is the most
easily understood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats
some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical,
although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of
differences in treatment .... Undoubtedly disparate treatment was the
most obvious evil Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VII.
Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from claims
that stress "disparate impact." The latter involved employment prac-
tices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but
that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be
justified by business necessity .... Proof of discriminatory motive, we
have held, is not required under a disparate-impact theory.
Id. at 335 n.115.
The Supreme Court has described the burden of proof in individual dispa-
rate treatment cases as follows:
The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden
under the statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimina-
tion. This may be done by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial mi-
nority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the
employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he
was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained
open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
complaintant's qualifications....
The burden then must shift to the employer to articulate some le-
gitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employee's rejection. ...
[Plaintiff then] must ... be afforded a fair opportunity to show that
[defendant's articulated reason for] rejection was in fact pretext.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). See generally Bel-
ton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof of Discrimination Cases: Toward a Theory of Proce-
dural Justice, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1205, 1235-47 (1981) (referring to McDonnell-
Douglas three-step formula as seminal articulation of allocation of burden of
proof in disparate treatment cases); Player, The Evidentiay Nature of Defendant's
Burden in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 49 Mo. L. REV. 17 (1984). For a dis-
NOTE
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applicant differently because of his or her race, color, sex, or national
origin.17 Proof of discriminatory intent is required under this theory.' 8
Under the disparate impact theory, a plaintiff need only show that his or
her employer is using an employment practice, that, although neutral on
its face, in fact has an adverse effect upon individuals of a particular race,
sex, or ethnic group. 19
While the proof requirements of the classic disparate impact cases
and disparate treatment cases are dissimilar, these differences become
less significant where a plaintiff brings both a disparate treatment claim
alleging a pattern or practice of discrimination 20 and a disparate impact
claim. Both pattern or practice disparate treatment claims and disparate
impact claims amount to an allegation "that an employer's practices
have had a systematic adverse effect on members of the plaintiff class." 2 1
Once a plaintiff in a pattern or practice claim meets his initial burden of
presenting statistical evidence sufficient to create a presumption of class-
wide discrimination, the employer will ordinarily rebut this presumption
by pointing to specific practices within the employment system causing
the disparity.2 2 Since these specific employment practices have been ar-
ticulated by the employer in response to the prima facie pattern and
practice claim, the essential elements of a disparate impact case are pres-
cussion of the evidence necessary to establish a prima facie case of disparate
impact, see infra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
17. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36
n.15 (1979).
18. Id. While proof of discriminatory intent is required under the disparate
treatment theory, it can be inferred from circumstantial evidence showing differ-
ences in treatment. Id.
19. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
20. In a pattern or practice disparate treatment case, the plaintiff class must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that "discrimination was the com-
pany's standard operating procedure." International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977). To make an initial showing of dispa-
rate treatment in a pattern or practice case, the plaintiff must present statistical
evidence of gross disparities in hiring or promotions. Id. at 339.
21. Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 2357 (1985).
22. The employer can rebut the presumption of discrimination in two ways.
First, the employer can claim that no disparity exists by demonstrating that the
plaintiff's statistics are inaccurate. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 339-40 (1977). If the employer fails to demonstrate a flaw
in the plaintiffis statistics, then the employer must offer evidence of a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the disparity. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1980). This rebuttal will typically require the de-
fendant to pinpoint an employment practice that in fact caused the disparity. Id.
at 258. Unlike the employer's burden of rebuttal in an individual disparate
treatment claim, the assertion of a nondiscriminatory explanation without a fac-
tual basis will not rebut an inference of class-wide discrimination. Id. See gener-
ally Comment, Defendant's Burden of Proof in Title VII Class Action Disparate Treatment
Suits, 31 AM. U.L. REV. 775 (1982).
382 [Vol. 31: p. 377
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ent.3 Consequently, at least two circuits have held that if the plaintiffs
are able to first establish a prima facie pattern and practice claim, tradi-
tional disparate impact analysis may be used in assessing the validity of
the specific employment practices introduced by the employer to rebut
the pattern or practice claim.2 4 Thus, pattern and practice claims and
23. Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See also Griffin v.
Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516, 1528 (11 th Cir. 1985) (citing Segar, 738 F.2d at 1249).
24. See, e.g., Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516, 1525-28 (11 th Cir. 1985);
Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1270 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2357
(1985). In Segar v. Smith, a class comprising black special agents employed by
the federal Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) brought title VII employment dis-
crimination actions under both disparate treatment and disparate impact theo-
ries. Id. at 1260. Proceeding under the disparate treatment theory, the plaintiffs
alleged that the entirety of DEA's employment system resulted in a pattern or
practice of illegal discrimination. Id. at 1266. Using the disparate impact the-
ory, plaintiffs challenged several of DEA's employment practices-including ini-
tial grade assignments, work assignments, supervisory evaluations, discipline,
and promotion decisions. Id. at 1277. Based on the plaintiffs showing of dispar-
ity resulting from DEA's five specific employment practices, the court held that
the promotion process had a disparate impact on blacks. Id. at 1288. Turning
to the plaintiffs pattern or practice case, the District of Columbia Circuit held
that because the employer had failed to rebut the presumption of discrimination
established by plaintiffs, DEA had engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimina-
tion against black special agents. Id. Moreover, the court noted that even if
DEA had successfully rebutted the disparate impact claim by pointing to a spe-
cific employment practice that explained the disparity, disparate impact analysis
would be applicable to assess the validity of those practices. Id. The District of
Columbia Circuit explained that as a result of the plaintiff's prima facie showing
of disparity in a pattern and practice case and the defendant's rebuttal explana-
tion of the disparity, the court would have had all the necessary components of a
disparate impact claim. Id. The Segar court was not persuaded by the concern of
the Fifth Circuit in Pouncy regarding the propriety of using a disparate impact
theory in situations where the plaintiffs have not themselves identified specific
employment practice(s) allegedly causing a disparity violative of title VII.
The two concerns of the Fifth Circuit in Pouncy were that (1) it would be
unfair to force the defendant to identify the employment practice causing the
adverse impact (since the initial burden in a disparate impact claim should be on
the plaintiff); and (2) it could force the defendant to justify the entire range of its
employment practices when a plaintiff shows only that a disparity exists. See Se-
gar, 738 F.2d at 1270 (citing Pouncy, 668 F.2d at 800; Rivera v. City of Wichita
Falls, 665 F.2d 531, 539 (5th Cir. 1982)). First, the Segar court explained that in
the situation where the plaintiff has made out a prima facie pattern or practice
case, there would, "the fears of the Pouncy court notwithstanding . . . [be no]
additional burden of articulation" on the employer, since "to rebut the disparate
treatment [pattern and practice] claim the employer will have had to articulate
which employment practices cause an observed disparity." 738 F.2d at 1271.
The Segar court countered the second concern of the Fifth Circuit by noting that
an employer will not be required to validate every component of its employment
system to rebut the plaintiffs' pattern and practice or disparate impact claim. Id.
Rather, it would only be necessary for the employer to validate the components
of its employment system that it identified as the source of the disparity. Id.
The Segar court supported its positionby observing that employers have
greater access, as well as greater insight into, the internal mechanisms of their
employment system than employees. Id. This greater access and insight warrant
requiring the defendant-employer to prove the business necessity of any em-
ployment practice, as well as requiring the employer to identify the specific em-
1986] NOTE
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disparate impact claims may converge in such a way that both may be
applied concurrently to the same factual situation.
The traditional disparate impact theory was first developed in Griggs
v. Duke Power Co. 25 In Griggs, the plaintiff alleged that his employer's
policy of requiring a high school diploma or a passing score on a high
school equivalency test, before processing any employee's departmental
transfer request, had a disparate impact on black employees. 26 The
United States Supreme Court held that title VII prohibits the employer's
use of any facially neutral employment practice or criterion having a dis-
criminatory impact on a protected class unless the employer can prove
that such practice or criterion bears a demonstrable relationship to per-
formance of the job.2 7
In contrast to the disparate treatment theory, the disparate impact
theory focuses on the result of, rather than the motivation for an em-
ployment procedure. 2 8 The plaintiff does not need to prove an intent to
discriminate, but only that a facially neutral standard underlying the
procedure operates to exclude members of the protected class at a dis-
proportionate rate.29 The burden then shifts to the employer to show
ployment practice(s) having an adverse impact. Id. The court emphasized that
placing the burden on the plaintiff to identify the specific procedure causing the
disparity would defeat the purpose of title VII-"to achieve equality of opportu-
nity by rooting out 'artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary' employer-created barri-
ers to professional development." Id. (quoting Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S.
440, 451 (1982)).
The Eleventh Circuit has adopted the analysis of the Segar court. See Griffin
v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516, 1528 (11 th Cir. 1985). For a discussion of the facts of
Griffin, see infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
25. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
26. Id. at 425-26.
27. Id. at 431. The Court stated:
[Title VII] proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices
which are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone
is business necessity. If an employment practice which operates to ex-
clude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the
practice is prohibited.
Id. For a discussion of the importance of Griggs in breaking down the barriers of
discrimination and promoting equal employment opportunity, see Blumrosen,
Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Dis-
crimination, 71 MicH. L. REV. 59 (1972).
28. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432. The Griggs Court stated that
good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem em-
ployment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as "built-in
headwinds" for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job
capability.... Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences
of employment practices, not simply the motivation. More than that,
Congress has placed on the employer the burden of showing that any
given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employ-
ment in question.
Id. (emphasis supplied by Court).
29. Id. at 432. The courts and the agencies that enforce federal civil rights
statutes primarily have relied on two methods for determining if the requisite
discriminatory impact has been proved. The first, known as the four-fifths rule,
[Vol. 31: p. 377
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that the procedure bears a demonstrable relationship to an individual's
job performance, and thus qualifies as a "business necessity." 30
The Supreme Court further developed the disparate impact theory
in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody. 3 ' In Albemarle, the plaintiff alleged that
is found in the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures (Guide-
lines). 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (1984). In the Guidelines, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission and all other enforcement agencies of the federal civil
rights statutes adopt the view that if a selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic
group is less than four-fifths (80%) of the figure for the group with the highest
selection rate, then the complainant employee has shown a prima facie case of
disparate impact. Id. It is important to note that the Guidelines are only appli-
cable to prosecutorial actions taken by federal agencies, and not to the federal
courts. M. ALBUM & T. GIES, supra note 1, at 159. However, some courts have
relied on the four-fifths rule. See, e.g., Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City
of St. Louis, 616 F.2d 350 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981).
Other courts have used the standard deviation method to determine if variations
in hiring or promotions amount to a showing of disparate impact. See Hazel-
wood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); Castaneda v. Partido,
430 U.S. 482 (1977). Under the standard deviation method, a statistical dispar-
ity which exceeds two or three standard deviations between the expected
number (absent discrimination) and the actual number of minority employees
hired or promoted, establishes disparate impact. An in-depth discussion of the
mechanics of this statistical method is beyond the scope of this note. For a more
detailed discussion of the standard deviation method, see Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at
308-09 n.14.
30. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. In Griggs, the Court determined that the high
school diploma requirement and the general intelligence test that had an ad-
verse impact on the hiring of blacks were not necessary to the conduct of busi-
ness and thus was improper. Id. The court held that in order for an
employment practice to be upheld it must be "shown to bear a demonstrable
relationship to successful performance of the jobs for which it was used." Id.
Following the Court's articulation of the business necessity defense in
Griggs, the courts have differed on the necessary standard of proof. See Con-
treras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1275-76 (9th Cir. 1981) ("courts
differ on just what an employer must prove to discharge its burden [of proving
business necessity]"), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1021 (1982); Willborn, supra note 9, at
803 (business necessity standard is unclear limit on disparate impact theory);
Comment, The Business Necessity Defense to Disparate-Impact Liability Under Title VII,
46 U. CHI. L. REV. 911, 912 (1979) (courts take both restrictive and broad ap-
proach to business necessity). Thus, courts have differed on the weight of the
employers' burden. While courts differ as to the definition of business necessity,
it is clearly a greater burden on the defendant than that required of the defend-
ant in a disparate treatment case. Under the individual disparate impact case the
employer only has the burden "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason" for the adverse action. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 802 (1973). For instance, a nondiscriminatory reason for disparate promo-
tions would be that the plaintiff was less qualified than persons chosen for pro-
motion. See, e.g., Page v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 227, 230 (4th Cir. 1981).
A detailed survey of the business necessity defense is beyond the scope of
this note. For a more detailed discussion of the this defense, see generally B.
SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 1, at 1328-30; Note, Business Necessity: Judicial
Dualism and the Search for Adequate Standards, 15 GA. L. REV. 376 (1981) (strict
requirements for job necessity will best serve purpose of title VII); Comment,
supra.
31. 422 U.S. 405 (1975). In Albemarle, the Court held that employers assert-
ing a business necessity defense to a disparate impact challenge must prove that
9
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his employer's use of general ability tests, on which a minimum score
was required before an employee could be considered for a particular
position, had a disparate impact on blacks.3 2 The Court held that since
the employer failed to show the tests were job-related, their use would
be prohibited.3 3 More importantly, the Court held that although an em-
ployer may overcome the plaintiffis prima facie case by proving the pro-
cedure at issue is job-related, 34 a plaintiff may nevertheless prevail in
demonstrating that other, non-discriminatory methods exist by which
the employer could reach his goal of obtaining qualified employees. 35
More recently, in Connecticut v. Teal3 6 the Supreme Court held that
employers cannot defend the use of employment practices or criteria
which have an adverse impact on a protected group at certain stages
simply by alleging that the overall employment process does not pro-
duce a disparate impact on that group. 37 Under Teal, an individual
the employment practice is significantly correlated with relevant work behavior.
Id. at 431. The employer was unable to make any showing that the challenged
tests measured a skill necessary to proper performance of the job. Id. at 412.
32. Id. at 410-11.
33. Id. at 435-36. Under the disparate impact theory the employer must
validate the practice, i.e., prove that the challenged practice is manifestly related
to job performance. Id. at 425 (citing Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432).
There are three methods of proving that the challenged practice is related
to job performance: criterion validation (comparing test results with subsequent
job performance), content validation (devising a test that measures the knowl-
edge and skill required for efficient job performance), and construct validation
(identifying general mental and psychological characteristics that are deter-
mined important in job performance and utilizing employment criteria related
to such traits). M. ALBUM & T. GIES, supra note 1, at 169-72. See generally B.
SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 1, at 162-90; Doverspike, Barrett & Alexan-
der, The Feasibility of Traditional Validation Procedures for Demonstrating Job Related-
ness, 9 LAw & PSYCHOLOGY REV. 35 (1985); Gwartney, Asher, Haworth &
Haworth, Statistics, the Law and Title VII. An Economist's View, 54 NOTRE DAME
LAw. 633 (1979) (criticism of test validation procedures).
34. 422 U.S. at 425. To establish a prima facie case of disparate impact, the
Albermarle Court noted that the employee must show that the practice in question
selects applicants for hire or promotion in a racial pattern significantly different
from that of the pool of applicants. Id.
35. Id.
36. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
37. Id. at 453-54. In Teal, black state employees claimed, under the dispa-
rate impact theory, that a written promotion examination discriminated against
them on account of their race in violation of title VII. Id. at 443-44. In order to
obtain a permanent promotion as a supervisor, the applicant had to first pass a
written examination. Id. at 443. Plaintiffs, having failed the written examina-
tion, were excluded from consideration for the permanent position. Id. How-
ever, the lower court found that although the passing rates for the written exam
alone manifested an adverse impact upon blacks, the overall selection process
resulted in a non-adverse impact on blacks since blacks were selected at a higher
rate than whites. Id. at 445. The employer claimed that this overall nondis-
parate result was a complete defense to the employees' suit. Id. at 442. The
Supreme Court rejected this argument, noting that it "ignores the fact that Title
VII guarantees these individual respondents the opportunity to compete equally
10
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plaintiff has a better chance of success in a disparate impact challenge
since the employer is prevented from using this "bottom line" de-
fense.3 8 The only way for an employer to avoid liability in such in-
stances is to demonstrate that the particular practice in question is not
an artificial, arbitrary, or unnecessary employer-created barrier to the
professional development of the protected group. 39
The Griggs decision, which introduced the disparate impact theory
and its progeny, involved only one specific, objective employment crite-
rion: the use of a standardized intelligence test or a high school diploma
as a prerequisite for interdepartmental transfers. 40 Because of the nar-
row factual context in which the disparate impact theory was developed,
there is much debate concerning the theory's expanded use in other sit-
uations. One example is the dispute over whether the disparate impact
theory may be used to challenge a multicomponent employment system
where the plaintiff has been unable to identify any specific practice as the
source of the discrimination. 4 1
II. APPLYING THE DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY TO CHALLENGE
MULTICOMPONENT EMPLOYMENT SYSTEMS
A. Cases Refusing to Apply the Theory: Pouncy v. Prudential
Insurance Co.
To date, five federal circuits42 led by the Fifth Circuit in Pouncy v.
with white workers on the basis of job-related criteria." Id. at 451 (emphasis
added by Court).
38. The "bottom line" defense is used by employers to argue that an over-
all employment process having an equal impact upon members of the protected
group is not subject to attack under the disparate impact theory. See generally M.
ALBUM & T. GIES, supra note 1, at 161-69; Rigler, Connecticut v.' Teal: The
Supreme Court's Latest Exposition of Disparate Impact Analysis, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
313 (1984) (characterizing Teal as focusing on classifications and limitations
rather than jobs and promotions); Comment, Connecticut v. Teal: Extending
Griggs Beyond the Bottom Line, 44 U. Prrr. L. REV. 751 (1983) (characterizing Teal
as evidence of Court's continuing dedication to removal of discriminatory
barriers).
39. Teal, 457 U.S. at 451.
40. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 427-28. Cf. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321
(1977) (also involving title VII challenge to specific objective employment
criterion).
41. D. BALDUS &J. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION § 1.23, at
22 (Supp. 1984). Baldus and Cole note:
The limits of the domain of the disparate impact doctrine continue
unsettled. The most noteworthy issue concerns the applicability of the
doctrine outside the narrow context in which it was originally devel-
oped in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. In Griggs, the doctrine was applied to
overt, clearly identified nondiscretionary criteria whose effects could be
isolated from those of other criteria in the selection process.
Id. For a discussion of additional limits on the disparate impact theory, see gen-
erally Willborn, supra note 9.
42. The First, Third, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have followd
Pouncy. For a discussion of the relevant cases, see supra note 14.
11
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Prudential Insurance Co.4 3 have held that disparate impact analysis is not
an appropriate device for broad-based attacks on multicomponent em-
ployment systems. 44 In Pouncy, a former black insurance worker alleged,
inter alia, that his employer discriminated against black employees in
considering promotions. 45 In particular, Pouncy claimed that three em-
ployment practices-failure to post job openings, use of a level sys-
tem,4 6 and use of subjective criteria to evaluate employees-caused the
observed disparate impact.4 7 The Fifth Circuit determined that Pouncy
failed to present a prima facie case of disparate impact 48 because he
failed to prove statistically that the observed underrepresentation of
blacks in upper level positions was due to a single, identifiable employ-
ment practice. 49
Judge Reavley, writing for the majority in Pouncy, explained that
under the disparate impact theory a proof that the end product of an
employment system results in disparity is insufficient. 50 Instead the
court "require[s] proof that a specific practice results in a discriminatory
impact on a class in an employer's workforce in order to allocate fairly
the parties' respective burdens of proof at trial."' 5 1 The court noted that
to hold otherwise would require the employer to validate all the compo-
nents of his entire employment system. 52 Other circuits embracing the
43. 668 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1982).
44. Id. at 800. The Pouncy court stated:
The discriminatory impact model of proof in an employment dis-
crimination case is not ... the appropriate vehicle from which to launch
a wide ranging attack on the cumulative effect of a company's employ-
ment practices .... The disparate impact model applies only when an
employer has instituted a specific procedure, usually a selection crite-
rion for employment, that can be shown to have a causal connection to
a class based imbalance in the work force.
Id. at 800.
45. Id. at 797.
46. Plaintiff acknowledged that his employer had no experience or educa-
tional prerequisites for hires into its entry-level positions, but claimed that
blacks were concentrated in the very lowest jobs in the level system and were
absent in the upper-level jobs. Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co., 499 F. Supp. 427,
442 (S.D. Tex. 1980). Prudential's level system consists of classification of its
various departments into 300 to 350 job titles. Id. at 446. Personnel in each
division write a job description of each position. Id. The personnel department
evaluates the position according to a point system and assigns a level to each
job. Id. Each level also has a minimum and maximum range of salaries. Id. The
plaintiff claimed that blacks are often hired at the entry level and receive the
least skilled and lowest paying positions within that level. Pouncy, 668 F.2d at
799.
47. 668 F.2d at 799.
48. Id. at 801. The court explained that "a prima facie case is shown by
identification of a neutral employment practice coupled with proof of its discrim-
inatory impact on the employer's work force." Id. at 800.
49. Id. at 801-02.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 801. The Fifth Circuit reasoned:
388 [Vol. 31: p. 377
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Pouncy doctrine have similarly held that the plaintiff must identify a spe-
cific procedure resulting in disparate impact in order to have a cogniza-
ble claim.5 3
B. Cases Applying the Theory: Griffin v. Carlin
At present, two federal circuits courts have held that a plaintiff may
use the disparate impact theory to challenge a multicomponent employ-
ment system as a whole.54 The leading case advocating application of
the disparate impact theory in this context, Griffin v. Carlin5 5 provides a
thorough analysis of this issue.
The Eleventh Circuit, in Griffin,56 considered an attack on a mul-
ticomponent employment system. 5 7  In Griffin, several employees at-
We do not permit a plaintiff to challenge an entire range of employ-
ment practices merely because the employer's work force reflects a ra-
cial imbalance that might be causally related to any one or more of
several practices for to do so "would allow the disparate impact of one
element to require validation of other elements having no adverse ef-
fects. The burden of determining the validity of a screening procedure,
weighing not only on the employer but also on the limited resources of
the district court, will not be imposed where proof of an absence of
discriminatory effect attributable to the procedure shows it to be
unwarranted."
Id. (quoting Rivera v. City of Wichita Falls, 665 F.2d 531, 539 (5th Cir. 1982)).
For a discussion of other rationales for limiting the disparate impact analysis
to challenges of specific employment criteria, see Willborn, supra note 9, at 829-
31.
53. For a discussion of the cases following Pouncy, see supra note 14 and
accompanying text.
54. See supra note 15. The Eighth and Eleventh Circuits have held the dis-
parate impact analysis to be applicable to challenge the various components of
an employment system simultaneously. In Gilbert, black police officers brought
an action against the City of Little Rock and others, claiming discrimination by
the Little Rock Police Department, specifically in its promotion system. 722
F.2d at 1393. The Eighth Circuit held that the lower court's analysis was errone-
ous because it failed to focus on the effect of the interrelationship of numerous
employment practices on the employment system as a whole. Id. at 1396.
55. 755 F.2d 1516 (11th Cir. 1985).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1519. Plaintiffs filed a class action suit in 1972 challenging their
employer's use of discriminatory grade assignment and promotion methods. Id.
In 1973, the court granted plaintiffs permission to proceed as representative of a
class but dismissed the portion of the suit that challenged the use of a written
test in the promotion procedure. Id. In 1976, plaintiff Griffin, a black employee
was fired. Id. He appealed the discharge to the United States Civil Service Com-
mission claiming discrimination because of race. Id. On the district court's or-
der a consolidated claim was filed in 1981. Id. at 1520. In 1982, the district
court granted defendant's motion to dismiss all claims based on disparate im-
pact theory because the plaintiffs' pleadings had not given the employer notice
of the specific objective employment practices being challenged. Id. The case
proceeded to trial on the disparate treatment theory alone. Id. The plaintiffs
appealed the district court's dismissal of the challenge to written tests used in
the promotion system, exclusion of their disparate impact claims and findings of
no disparate treatment. Id.
13
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tempted to apply the disparate impact theory to challenge a
multicomponent promotion system. 58 The Giffin court rejected the
concerns expressed by the Fifth Circuit in Pouncy, and held that the dis-
parate impact analysis is an appropriate vehicle for attacking an entire
employment system.5 9
In support of its position, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the
Supreme Court in Griggs frequently referred to employment "practices"
and "procedures," terminology that embraces more than single ele-
ments of an employment system. 60 The Griffin majority also noted that,
when given the opportunity in Connecticut v. Teal,6 1 the Supreme Court
declined to expressly mention or to imply that disparate impact analysis
was inappropriate for challenging an entire employment system.6 2 In
particular, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the Teal Court cited a Senate
report63 which described employment discrimination as a "complex and
pervasive phenomenon" involving "systems" and "effects."
'64
58. Id. at 1522. Plaintiffs in their disparate impact claims challenged the
promotion process as a whole and several components of that system including
promotion advisory boards, details (temporary assignments to higher level posi-
tions to substitute for absent employees), awards, and discipline. Id. The Elev-
enth Circuit held that the district court erred in limiting the application of the
disparate impact theory to single objective employment practices. Id. at 1525.
59. Id. at 1523-24. The court found ample binding precedent in the Fifth
Circuit to require application of a disparate impact analysis. See id. at 1523 (cit-
ing cases). Even if these cases were not binding, the Eleventh Circuit stated that
it would have rejected the Pouncy rationale based on subsequent decisions. Id. at
1523-24 & 1524 n.6 (citing, inter alia, Page v. United States Indus., 726 F.2d 1038
(5th Cir. 1984)). The court noted that although several subsequent Fifth Circuit
cases have followed Pouncy, the Fifth Circuit applied disparate impact analysis to
a subjective promotion sytem in Page v. United States Indus., 726 F.2d 1038 (5th
Cir. 1984). 755 F.2d at 1524 n.6. In Page, a class of black and Mexican-Ameri-
can employees of U.S. Industries brought claims under the disparate threatment
theory and disparate impact theory alleging that their employer's promotion,
job placements, initial work assignment, and wages were discriminatory. 726
F.2d at 1041-42. The court applied the disparate impact analysis to to the em-
ployer's subjective employment system, which included the following compo-
nents: (1) the foreman's determination as to whether the employee could take
the requisite tests for promotion; (2) welding tests; and (3) the foreman's deter-
mination of whether the employee had the requisite mathetmatical skills for pro-
motion. Id. at 1043. The Court held that although the disparate impact theory
may be applied to a subjective promotion system, the plaintiffs had failed to
show the requisite adverse impact. Id. at 1054.
60. Id. at 1524.
61. 457 U.S. 400 (1982), for a discussion of Teal, see supra notes 36-38 and
accompanying text.
62. 755 F.2d at 1524 (citing Teal, 457 U.S. at 448-52).
63. See S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1971).
64. 755 F.2d at 1524 (citing Teal, 457 U.S. at 447 n.8). The Griffin court
emphasized that even the dissenters in Teal conceded that disparate impact anal-
ysis was applicable in challenges to entire employment systems. The court
stated:
The dissenters in Teal, while disagreeing with the Court's conclusion
that the bottom line could not be used as a defense, clearly indicated
14
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The Griffin court emphasized that, on a practical level, prohibiting
the general attack of a multicomponent employment system under the
disparate impact theory would "completely exempt the situation in
which an adverse impact is caused by the interaction of two or more
components." 6 5 Finally, the court further pointed out that the Uniform
Guidelines of Employer Selection Procedures66 construe the disparate
impact analysis as appropriate for challenging more than a single com-
ponent of an employment system. 67
III. ANALYSIS
As the existing body of case law indicates, the scope of the applica-
bility of the disparate impact analysis remains uncertain. 68 An inherent
problem with the concurrent development of two theories of discrimina-
tion-disparate impact and disparate treatment-is the interaction 69 be-
tween and factual application of each respective theory. 70 At present,
one of the most noteworthy controversies involves the applicability of
the disparate impact analysis beyond the prototypical case in which the
plaintiff challenges "overt, clearly identified nondiscretionary criteria...
in the selection process." 7 1 To date, the Supreme Court has only ap-
their understanding that disparate impact challenges could be made to
the total selection process. The dissenters stated that 'our disparate-
impact cases consistently have considered whether the result of an em-
ployer's total selection process had an adverse impact on the protected
group.'
Id. at 1524-25 (quoting Teal, 457 U.S. at 458 (Powell, J., dissenting)) (emphasis
in original).
65. 755 F.2d at 1525.
66. 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1984).
67. 755 F.2d at 1525. The court explained that the Guidelines define the
selection procedures to which the disparate impact theory applies as follows:
Any measure, combination of measures, or procedure used as a
basis for any employment decision. Selection procedures include the
full range of assessment techniques from traditional paper and pencil
tests, performance tests, training programs, or probationary periods
and physical, educational, and work experience requirements through
informal or casual interviews and unscored application forms.
Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1607.16(Q) (1984)).
68. For a discussion of the boundaries of the disparate impact theory as
defined by case law, see supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text. See also D.
BALDUS &J. COLE, supra note 41, § 1.23, at 22 (suggesting that disparate impact
theory is appropriate for challenging multicriteria employment practices and
highly subjective employment criteria).
69. For a further discussion of the interaction between the disparate impact
and disparate treatment theories, see C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS,
FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 1.14, at 30-35
(1980).
70. As one commentator has noted, "no clear standard has yet been devel-
oped by the courts to identify the factual situations in which disparate impact
claims will lie." D. BALDUS &J. COLE, supra note 41, § 1.2, at 46 (1980).
71. Id. § 1.23, at 22 (Supp. 1984).
NOTE
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plied the disparate impact theory to analyze challenges to specific objec-
tive employment practices, such as aptitude and intelligence tests, 7 2
educational requirements, 73 and height and weight requirements.7 4
However, the language and purpose of title VII as interpreted by the
courts, 75 as well as other practical implications, 76 support a broadening
of the use of a disparate impact analysis to include attacks on multicom-
ponent employment systems.
A. Statutory Language and Policies Underlying Title VII
Title VII strictly prohibits any employment practice that "in any
way" discriminates on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. 77 By expressly stating that employment practices "in any way" 7 8
resulting in discrimination are prohibited, the drafters of title VII indi-
cated their intent that the statute protect against discriminatory employ-
ment practices regardless of whether they result from a single
employment criterion or the interaction of several employment criteria.
Furthermore, as the Supreme Court in Griggs stated, "What Congress
has commanded is that any test used [by the employer] must measure the
person for the job and not the person in the abstract."' 79 The Griggs
Court concluded that title VII prohibits "procedures" or "mechanisms"
that result in a disparate impact on minority groups, language that may
include more than just specific, isolated components of an employment
system. 80 Thus, both the language of title VII, 8i as well as its purpose
as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Griggs,82 indicate that any prac-
tices or procedures, not merely isolated, single components of an em-
72. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 427 (requirement of high school education and
satisfactory scores on aptitude test).
73. See id.
74. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (action challenging em-
ployer's height and weight selection criteria that qualified disproportionately
low number of women).
75. For a discussion of the purpose of title VII as interpreted by the courts,
see supra note 4 and accompanying text.
76. For a discussion of the practical implications of refusing to apply dispa-
rate impact analysis to multicomponent employment practices, see infra notes
86-93 and accompanying text.
77. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982). For the text of this section, see supra note
3.
78. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
79. 401 U.S. at 435.
80. Id. at 436. More recently, the Court cited a Senate report endorsing
Griggs, which recognized that "[e]mployment discrimination as viewed today is a
... complex and pervasive phenomenon. Experts familiar with the subject now
generally describe the problem in terms of 'systems' and 'effects' rather than
simply intentional wrongs." Teal, 457 U.S. at 447 n.8 (quoting S. REP. No. 92-
415, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1971)).
81. For the relevant text of title VII, see supra note 3.
82. For a discussion of the purpose of title VII as interpreted by the Griggs
Court, see supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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ployment system, are unlawful if they result in a disparate impact on a
protected group. Consequently, it should be sufficient for an employee
to identify the general employment system resulting in a disparate im-
pact, rather than specifying each of its components, in order to have a
cognizable claim.
It is suggested that the Pouncy doctrine, which requires a disparate
impact claimant to attack a specific identifiable employment practice,
frustrates the avowed purpose of title VII.8 3 Adopting such a limitation
on the disparate impact theory allows complex, multifaceted employ-
ment systems to remain as barriers to the equality for employment op-
portunities Congress sought to secure under title VII. 84 More
importantly, it is in a complex factual context that discrimination is most
likely to occur because as the number of criteria increase there are more
sources from which bias may potentially enter the employment sys-
tem.8 5 Thus, the expansion of the disparate impact theory to include
challenges to multicomponent employment systems, as suggested by the
Griffin and Gilbert courts, would eliminate some of the remaining barriers
to equal employment opportunities beyond those resulting from a sin-
gle, easily identified employment practice.
B. Practical Implications of Limiting the Application of Disparate Impact
Analysis to a Single Specific Employment Criterion
Although the statutory language and judicial interpretation of title
VII provide compelling reasons not to restrict the use of the disparate
impact analysis, a few circuits have done so, arguing that disparate im-
pact is an inappropriate basis on which to attack a multicriteria employ-
ment system.8 6 Advocates of this position, led by the Pouncy court, urge
that the use of the theory in cases challenging multicriteria employment
83. See Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 2357 (1985).
84. Id. at 1271-72. The Segar court explained:
This purpose is not well served by a requirement that the plaintiff in
every case pinpoint at the outset the employment practices that cause
an observed disparity between those who appear to be comparably
qualified. Such a requirement in effect permits challenges only to read-
ily perceptible barriers; it allows subtle barriers to continue to work
their discriminatory effects, and thereby thwarts the crucial national
purpose that Congress sought to effectuate in Title VII.
Id.
85. See Green v. United States Steel Corp., 570 F. Supp. 254, 274 (1983).
In Green, the court noted that discrimination is most likely to occur in complex
multicomponent employment systems because such systems are likely to employ
several subjective components that, when applied, may be colored by an em-
ployer's conscious or unconscious bias toward a particular group. Id.
86. For a discussion of circuits prohibiting the use of the disparate impact
theory in cases challenging multicomponent employment practices, see supra
notes 42-51 and accompanying text.
1986] NOTE
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systems would unfairly burden an employer8 7 by requiring it to prove
the business necessity of each component of its entire employment sys-
tem whenever disparate impact is alleged. 88 However, as one court has
noted, in the situation in which the plaintiff establishes a prima facie
disparate treatment claim along with a systemic disparate impact claim,
an employer's burden is not increased, since the employer already will
have had to identify the source of the discriminatory result as part of its
defense to the companion disparate treatment claim.8 9
Moreover, the plaintiff is often unable to obtain the information
concerning his employer's system that is necessary to meet his burden of
specifying the particular practice causing the disparate impact. 90 The
employer "will possess knowledge far superior to that of the plaintiff as
to precisely how its employment practices affect employees" and should
consequently bear the burden of identifying the specific practice causing
87. 668 F.2d at 795. The Pouncy court explained the employer's burden as
follows:
We require proof that a specific practice results in a discriminatory
impact on a class in an employer's work force in order to allocate fairly
the parties' respective burdens of proof at trial. The aggrieved party
must prove a disparate impact due to the selection procedure. The em-
ployer then has the burden of proving that the selection procedure is
justified by a legitimate business reason. Identification by the ag-
grieved party of the specific employment practice responsible for the
disparate impact is necessary so that the employer can respond by of-
fering proof of its legitimacy.
Id. at 800-01 (citations omitted).
88. For a discussion of the allocation of burdens of proof for plaintiff and
defendant in a disparate impact case, see supra notes 29-30 and accompanying
text.
89. Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d at 1271. The Segar court noted that normally
disparate impact and pattern or practice disparate treatment claims are brought
together since both share "the allegation that an employer's practices have had a
systematic adverse effect on members of a plaintiffs class." Id. at 1266. For a
further discussion of Segar, see supra notes 21 & 23-24 and accompanying text.
See also International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15
(1979) ("Either theory may, of course, be applied to a particular set of facts.");
Carpenter v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 706 F.2d 608, 619 (5th Cir. 1983)
(disparate impact theory and disparate treatment theory may be applicable to
same set of facts);Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line Ry., 678 F.2d 992, 1014 (11 th
Cir. 1982) (disparate impact and disparate treatment theories are both proper
methods for proving discriminatory employment practices); Wright v. National
Archives & Records Serv., 609 F.2d 702, 711 (4th Cir. 1979) (disparate impact
and disparate treatment are "alternative theories upon which a right to relief
under Title VII may be established in a given case"). For a discussion of the
employer's burden of proof in a disparate treatment case, seek supra note 20 and
accompanying text.
90. Segar v. Smith 738 F.2d at 1271. See D. BALDUS &J. COLE, supra note 41,
§ 1.23, at 24 ("When a ... multistage selection process produces an overall
disparate impact, but a lack of data limits the plaintiff's ability to prove its
source, the plaintiff's burden of proof should be satisfied with proof of overall
disparate impact.").
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the disproportionate impact.9 1 This solution places the burden of proof
on the party with the best access to the data critical to the causation
issue-the employer. 9 2 Allocating the burden of proof to the employer
by authorizing use of the disparate impact theory also prevents employ-
ers from evading the mandate of title VII by developing complex, mul-
tifaceted employment systems that might otherwise prove difficult for an
employee to analyze and attack.
93
91. Segarv. Smith, 738 F.2d at 1271. See also D. BALDUS &J. COLE, supra note
41, § 1.23, at 24.
92. Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d at 1271.
93. See Green v. United States Steel Corp., 570 F. Supp. 254, 274 (E.D. Pa.
1983). The Green court stated:
If defendant were correct in its legal position, relying on Pouncy, any
employer could immunize its hiring, promotional and lay-off selection
systems from class-action attack simply by making them as standardless
as possible, by diffusing responsibility for making employment deci-
sions among as many individuals as possible, and by failing to review
the results of those individuals' exercise of discretion. As Rowe and its
progeny have recognized, it is precisely in this sort of setting that dis-
crimination is most likely to occur.
Id.
One practical result of adherence to the Pouncy decision is the immunization
of many upper level employment practices from disparate impact attack because
such practices are more likely multifaceted and thus it is difficult to identify the
specific source of the disparity. See Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High
Places, 95 HARV. L. REV. 947, 998-99 (1982).
According to Professor Bartholet:
Differences between upper and lower level jobs and job systems will
require some creativity if traditional title VII standards are to be
adapted and applied on the upper level .... Selection Systems on the
upper level are also likely to be multifactored and discretionary, and
therefore more difficult to analyze, while lower level systems often rely
on a few absolute, objective requirements-attaining a score above the
cutoff on a civil service test, passing a physical examination or possess-
ing a high school diploma.
Given these differences, the courts must develop new methods for
assessing both the job relatedness and the racial impact of upper level
selection systems.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Bartholet suggests that the courts take advantage of
computer technology and sophisticated statistical methods, such as multiple re-
gression, to analyze complex, subjective systems in order to determine what fac-
tors are important in decision-making. Id. at 999. A multiple regression analysis
allows one to determine the degree to which each of a number of factors influ-
ences an employment decision. M. ALBUM & T. GIEs, supra note 1, at 329.
Under the multiple regression model, a certain dependent variable, such as pro-
motion, is a linear mathematic function of other independent variables such as
seniority, a score on a written test and so forth. Id. The main advantage of
regression analysis is its ability to "control" for a number of factors that operate
simultaneously in an employment decision. Id. at 330-31. In other words, this
statistical method permits one to determine the degree to which one factor, for
instance, race or sex alone, affects an employee's promotion. Id. at 331. See
Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 505 F. Supp. 224 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (explana-
tion of mechanics of regression analysis, as well as other statistical techniques
utilized to determine influence of various factors in employment system), va-
cated, 723 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1984). See generally D. BALDUS &J. COLE, supra note
19
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It is therefore submitted that the plaintiff in a disparate impact case
should be required to prove only overall disparate impact (disparity at
the "bottom line") and that the employer, who has greater insight into
and access to the system, should have the burden of identifying the spe-
cific components of the employment system causing the disparate im-
pact.9 4 This approach is more equitable and fair than requiring an
employee to identify the source of the discrimination, since it places the
burden of identification on the party with the better knowledge of the
employment system. Under this approach an employer is no longer able
to insulate his employment system from civil scrutiny merely by making
it as complex and multifaceted as possible. Thus, subjecting mul-
ticriteria, nonspecific employment systems to disparate impact analysis
brings more equitable results, consistent with the purpose of title VII
and in keeping with the Supreme Court's declaration that title VII re-
41; Barnes, The Problem of Multiple Components or Divisions in Title VII Litigation: A
Coment, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1983, at 185; Boardman & Vining, The
Role of Probative Statistics in Employment Discrimination Cases, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Autumn 1983, at 189; Finkelstein, The Judicial Reception of Multiple Regres-
sion Studies in Race and Sex Discrimination Cases, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 737 (1980);
Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 702 (1980); Fol-
lett & Welch, supra note 1, at 171; Note, Beyond the Prima Facie Case in Employment
Discrimination Law. Statistical Proof and Rebuttal, 89 HARV. L. REV. 387 (1975).
Therefore, should an employer have a complex multicomponent sytem which is
unfamiliar to an employee, a competent statistician may pinpoint the effect of
each component of the entire system. M. ALBUM &J. GIES, supra note 1, at 329.
Moreover, as the courts and at least one commentator have noted, the employer,
having the greatest access to and understanding of his employment process, is in
the best positoin to identify the factors or independent variables which must be
"plugged into" a regression analysis. See, e.g., Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249,
1271 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2357 (1985); D. BALDUS &J. COLE,
supra note 41, § 1.23, at 24.
94. See Green v. United States Steel Corp., 570 F. Supp. 254, 274 (E.D. Pa.
1983). In Green, the court stated:
In this case, plaintiffs proved that they are black; that they applied
for jobs for which they possessed the minimal qualifications; that they
are rejected, although others were hired; and that the hiring selection
process under which they were rejected selected blacks for hire signifi-
cantly less often then whites, in comparison to the racial make-up of the
applicant pool. Further refinement of plaintiffs' definition of the hiring se-
lection system they attack was made impossible by defendant's own refusal to be
pinned down as to the selection criteria it employs, beyond listing the twenty subjec-
tive criteria set forth in Finding of Fact No. 39 and stating that these criteria were
applied as an 'amalgram.' Under these circumstances, I conclude that
plaintiffs have made out a prima facie case of disparate impact, and that
it is fair to turn to the defendant for some justification of a selection
process which produces apparently discriminatory results.
Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). See also D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra
note 41, § 1.23, at 24. For a discussion of the traditional burden of proof re-
quirements in a disparate impact case, see supra note 29-30 and accompanying
text.
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quires "the removal of artificial, arbitrary and unnecessary barriers to
employment" 95 that are discriminatory in effect.
Penelope M. Taylor
95. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
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